Security models
Security assumptions

- Security proofs are often made in terms of existing schemes:
  - if you can break new scheme B, then you’d be able to break old scheme A, which we assume is hard.
- eg: under the random oracle model, if you could break taproot, then you could break DLP in general
- Why do we think that DLP is hard?
- Because we haven’t broken it yet!
Secure compared to what?
Can we lower the cost of interacting with the Bitcoin network while maintaining an acceptable security level?
● Full and pruned nodes
● Light clients
● Checkpoints, assumevalid and assumeutxo
● Alternative UTXO set proposals
● Further reading
Full and pruned nodes
Full node

- Downloads all headers and blocks
- Validates all blocks and transactions in the most-work blockchain
- May validate and relay unconfirmed transactions
Pruned node

- Downloads and validates all blocks and headers
- Discards all block files over a certain storage limit
Light clients
SPV Nodes

8. Simplified Payment Verification

It is possible to verify payments without running a full network node. A user only needs to keep a copy of the block headers of the longest proof-of-work chain, which he can get by querying network nodes until he's convinced he has the longest chain, and obtain the Merkle branch linking the transaction to the block it's timestamped in. He can't check the transaction for himself, but by linking it to a place in the chain, he can see that a network node has accepted it, and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it.

As such, the verification is reliable as long as honest nodes control the network, but is more vulnerable if the network is overpowered by an attacker. While network nodes can verify transactions for themselves, the simplified method can be fooled by an attacker's fabricated transactions for as long as the attacker can continue to overpower the network. One strategy to protect against this would be to accept alerts from network nodes when they detect an invalid block, prompting the user's software to download the full block and alerted transactions to confirm the inconsistency. Businesses that receive frequent payments will probably still want to run their own nodes for more independent security and quicker verification.
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SPV nodes - what they can do

- Can verify that a transaction has been confirmed by a certain amount of work
- Know what the most accumulated work chain is
SPV nodes - what they can’t do

- Determine whether the block, or the transaction chain is valid
- Enforce your set of consensus rules
- ... and so ensure that your preferred monetary policy/inflation schedule is being followed
- Give you the same level of privacy
- Detect false negatives
- Fee estimation
But what about Satoshi’s Vision?
Bloom filters

- Defined in BIP 37
- Implemented in Bitcoin Core in August 2012
- Allows a light client user to request their transactions without revealing everything about their addresses
- Uses probabilistic filters so there are false positives to conceal the user’s addresses/keys
- Not very effective at preserving privacy
- Places load on the server. Can be used as to DOS servers providing the filters
- Doesn’t work with segwit
- Generally not advised. Will probably be disabled by default in the next Bitcoin Core release
Compact Block Filters

- Defined in BIPs 157/158
- Flips the BIP 37 protocol. Instead of a server creating a unique filter for every client, the server creates one filter that is served to all clients
- Uses Golomb-Rice coding for compression
- Fully implemented in btcd
- Compact Block Filters and index are implemented for Bitcoin Core. P2P implementation is WIP
Checkpoints, assume valid and assume utxo
Origin of checkpoints

- Satoshi added checkpoints in 0.3.2 to prevent 51% attack from reorging the blockchain too far (200 blocks prior to release)
- Three checkpoints added:
  - 11111
  - 33333
  - 68555
- What it actually did: you can’t connect a block at height 68555 (or 33333, or 11111) unless it matches the prescribed hash.
- What it didn’t do: provide anti-DoS protections, or performance optimizations when syncing the prescribed chain.
Changes to checkpoints

- At some point, checkpoints started to be used to as an optimization during IBD. For blocks below the last checkpoint height, we would skip validation.
  - That was later changed to only skip script validation for ancestors of the checkpointed block

- Then checkpoints also started to be used as an anti-DoS measure; don’t process block headers that were timestamped older than the last checkpointed time.
## Additional checkpoints

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Height</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2010</td>
<td>70,567.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2011</td>
<td>128,600.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2012</td>
<td>168,403.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 2013</td>
<td>228,403.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 2014</td>
<td>295,000.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evolution of thinking

- Stopped adding checkpoints at 295,000 (July 2014)
- Generally, there’s concern philosophically about developer centralization/control if we keep pushing out new checkpoints.
- Separated checkpoints from signature skipping during IBD in 0.14, replaced with assumevalid.
- Started to use a new metric, nMinimumChainWork, for more anti-DoS protections, in places where checkpoints used to be used.
- Checkpoints still lock in the chain as a defense against low-difficulty headers being used to overwhelm a node.
What do we need to do in order to finally get rid of checkpoints?

- Need a defense against a low difficulty headers attack (memory blowup).
- One approach: soft fork in a min-difficulty that is higher than current.
- Another approach: p2p only changes. Can be done with new p2p messages.
assumevalid

- Specifies a block whose ancestors we assume all have valid scriptSigs
- Unlike checkpoints this has no influence on consensus (unless you set it to a block with an invalid history)
- Old releases with defaults will sync slower, but the value is configurable
- Is this trusting the developers?
With assumevalid, you assume that the people who peer review your software are capable of running a full node that verifies every block up to and including the assumedvalid block. This is no more trust than assuming that the people who peer review your software know the programming language it's written in and understand the consensus rules; indeed, it's arguably less trust because nobody completely understands a complex language like C++ and nobody probably understands every possible nuance of the consensus rules---yet almost anyone technical can start a node with -noassumevalid, wait a few hours, and check that bitcoin-cli getblock $assume_valid_hash returns has a "confirmations" field that's not -1.
assumeutxo

- The UTXO set at a certain height is snapshotted, and a hash commitment to the serialized set (+ block header hash) is made.
- The client takes the assumeutxo commitment, downloads the serialized UTXO set, syncs the headers chain to the committed block header, and then continues initial sync from that point to the tip.
- Once initial sync is complete, the node downloads the blocks from genesis to the assumeutxo block and verifies that the UTXO sets match.
assumeutxo (cont)

- Assumeutxo values could come from several places:
  - Provided as config option or RPC input
  - Hardcoded into the source code and reviewed as part of the release cycle
  - Committed to in coinbase transaction (?)

- Full UTXO set is then downloaded from one or more sources:
  - Initially out-of-band
  - In future, over the P2P network
Questions?
Comments?